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INTRODUCTION 
Craft's opening brief argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not 
objecting to the admission of two unreliable and suggestive witness 
identifications made of him by the victim of a robbery and burglary (a pretrial out 
of court photo identification and an in-court identification). In addition, Craft's 
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the improper 
admission of an incriminating hearsay statement made by the codefendants that 
placed Craft at the crime scene. Craft argues that these two instances of deficient 
performance are individually and cumulatively prejudicial. Lastly, Craft's opening 
brief argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of aggravated 
robbery and aggravated burglary where the only evidence of these crimes was two 
unreliable eyewitness identifications of Craft, an improperly admitted 
codefendant hearsay statement, and an ambiguous jail phone call. 
In response, the State contends that Craft has not proved deficient 
performance or prejudice in either of Craft's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims, that cumulative error does not exist, and that Craft did not preserve his 
insufficiency of the evidence claim, nevertheless, the evidence was sufficient to 
support Craft's convictions. For the reasons set forth in the opening brief and in 
this reply brief, the State is incorrect. See Utah R. App. P. 24 (c) ("Reply briefs 
shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief."). 
ARGUMENT 
I. Craft's convictions should be reversed because of the ineffective 
assistance of counsel that he received and because the evidence 
was insufficient to support his convictions of aggravated robbery 
and aggravated burglary. 
Craft's aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary convictions should be 
reversed because of the ineffective assistance of counsel he received and because 
the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Contrary to the State's 
arguments, (1) Trial counsel's failure to object to the admissibility of the 
unreliable and suggestive eyewitness identifications was objectively unreasonable 
and not a strategic decision; (2) Trial counsel's failure to object to the 
introduction of the hearsay statement made by the codefendants that placed Craft 
at the crime scene was objectively unreasonable and not a strategic decision; (3) 
Craft's insufficiency argument was preserved, properly briefed, and correct in 
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pointing out that there was insufficient evidence to support Craft's aggravated 
robbery and aggravated burglary convictions. See Appellee's Br. 19-53. 
A. Trial Counsel's failure to challenge the admissibility of the unreliable 
and suggestive eyewitness identifications was objectively unreasonable 
and not a strategic decision. 
Trial counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Craft's defense when he 
failed to object to the unreliable and suggestive eyewitness identifications made 
by Davis as violating Craft's due process rights under Utah Const. art. I, §7. 
Applying the pertinent factors outlined in State v. Long, the pre-trial 
identification of Craft did not pass constitutional muster where Davis was pistol 
whipped during the incident and had only a limited view of his assailant, and 
where a police officer suggested that Craft was the man in Davis' house during the 
robbery prior to Davis saying so. See 721 P.2d 483,488 (Utah 1986); State v. 
Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ,I19, 357 P.3d 20, cert. granted, 364 P.3d 48 (Utah 
2015); Utah Const. art I, §7; see also Appellant's Br. 19-31. Because the initial 
identification was constitutionally unreliable, it follows that the subsequent in 
court identification by Davis of Craft was also unreliable because it was tainted by 
this initial problematic identification. See Appellant's Br. 22, 30. 
Trial counsel's decision to call Dr. Dodd to testify about the various 
problems relating to eyewitness identifications in lieu of objecting to the 
admission of the constitutionally problematic eyewitness identifications was not 
sound trial strategy and was objectively unreasonable. See State v. Litherland, 
2000 UT 76, 119, 12 P.3d 92. Furthermore, it was not sound strategy for trial 
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counsel to give the jury a Long instruction that addressed the various issues that 
can affect the accuracy of any eyewitness identification in lieu of objecting to the 
admission of the constitutionally problematic eyewitness identification in the 
first place. R. 245, 591, 581-82, 584, 590-92; see also Long, 721 P .2d at 487-95. 
While trial counsel is not required to move for the suppression of eyewitness 
identifications in every case, it is objectively unreasonable to not seek 
suppression where numerous factors clearly indicate the constitutional 
unreliability of any given eyewitness identification. See State v. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d 774, 778-81 (Utah 1991); State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1110-11 (Utah 1994); 
Cf. State v. Mecham, 2000 UT App 247, ,I,J13- 16, 9 P.3d 777 (where this Court 
determined that trial counsel had a sound strategy in not seeking to suppress the 
eyewitness identifications because the identifications did not have the type of 
constitutional problems as seen in Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778-81 or Lopez, 886 
P.2d at 1110-11). 
In other words, no reasonable attorney would allow the jury to hear about 
constitutionally unreliable eyewitness identifications, like those that occurred in 
this case, only to attack their reliability at trial. See id. That is, because of the 
profound impact and influence that eyewitness identifications have on the jury, it 
is imperative to exclude unconstitutional eyewitness identifications altogether 
rather than seek to lessen their prejudicial impact on the jury. See State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 780 (Utah 1991) (pointing out the "great weight [that] 
jurors are likely to give eyewitness testimony.") (internal quotations and citations 
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omitted); see also State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, ,r15, 223 P.3d 1103 (stating that 
"juries seemed to be swayed the most by the confidence of an eyewitness."). 
Simply put, it is impossible to sufficiently 'unring the bell' of the prejudicial 
impact of an unconstitutional identification by trying to attack it after the jury 
has witnessed it. Thus, contrary to the State's claims, it was not reasonable trial 
strategy for Craft's counsel to not object to the introduction of the constitutionally 
unreliable eyewitness identifications because of the special importance that 
jurors place on this type of evidence. See Appellee's Br. 22-33 
In addition, contrary to the State's argument, the record in this case 
supports that the eyewitness identifications did not pass constitutional muster 
and that trial counsel performed deficiently in not objecting to them. See 
Appellee's Br. 23; see also Utah R. App. P. 23B; State v. Lee, 2014 UT App 4, ,I9, 
318 P .3d 1164 ("A [rule 23B] remand is not necessary if the facts underlying the 
ineffectiveness claim are contained in the existing record."). Here, the record 
clearly shows that Davis never had an opportunity to directly view the robbers in 
his house, without obstruction, for a lengthy period of time, and with good 
lighting. R. 400-01, 405, 412-17. During the few minutes when one of the men 
had removed his mask, Davis was face down on the carpet in a "sacrificial 
position[,]" so he could only see the maskless man in his "peripheral vision." R. 
400-01,412-15. He was also in a continued heightened level of stress as he was 
held at gunpoint and was hit and pistol whipped, leaving his "whole face [] 
bloody." R. 395, 398-99, 400-01, 412-14, 429. Davis's attention was also 
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distracted by his concern for his mother and the fact that there were three, not 
just one, uninvited men in his house. R.401, 404, 415-416, 429. 
In addition, the length of time between the incident and the initial 
identification of Craft, disputed as being as little as seven up to forty-eight hours, 
underscores the unreliability of the identification. R.421,434-35,531,544; 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783; See Appellant's Br. 26. And, Detective Torres failed to 
follow a number of safe-guard procedures for ensuring that any eyewitness 
identification made by Davis would be constitutionally reliable. See Appellant's 
Br. 14. Detective Torres also impermissibly suggested that Davis choose Craft's 
photo when Torres asked Davis if Craft was the man that he saw in his house 
during the burglary after Davis said that Craft "looked familiar." R. 546. Thus, 
because the record is clear that the eyewitness identifications did not pass 
constitutional muster, and the record also shows that at no time did trial counsel 
object to these identifications, the State is mistaken in arguing that Craft cannot 
prove trial counsel's deficient performance on this record. See Appellee's Br. 23. 
The State is also mistaken in arguing that trial counsel's deficient 
performance did not prejudice his defense. See Appellee's Br. 33. That is, apart 
from the problematic eyewitness identifications, there was a dearth of evidence to 
support that Craft was one of the three men involved in the robbery and burglary 
at Davis and Kirby's residence R. 394. Neither Craft's fingerprints nor DNA were 
found on any of the recovered stolen items. R. 547-548. The vehicle that was 
searched next to trailer 14 did not belong to Craft. R. 453, 458, 547, 612. In 
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addition, the ambiguous phone call made from the jail did not contain any 
incriminating statements and did not place Craft at the scene of the crime. Thus, 
had the problematic identifications been objected to and excluded from trial, 
there was a reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted Craft. 1 
B. Trial Counsel's failure to object to the introduction of the hearsay 
statement made by the codefendants that placed Craft at the crime 
scene was objectively unreasonable and not a strategic decision. 
The State is mistaken in arguing that trial counsel's performance was not 
prejudicially deficient when counsel failed to object and ask for a mistrial after 
Detective Torres introduced a nontestifying co-defendant hearsay statement that 
placed Craft at the scene of the crime, thus depriving Craft of his Sixth 
Amendment right to confront his accusers. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36, 42 (2004); see also R. 551-52 (where Detective Torres responds to the 
prosecutor's questions about how the pictures for the photo identification were 
chosen by saying, "As far as the other two defendants saying he was there.") 
(emphasis added); see also Appellee's Br.23. Furthermore, because the 
1 The State is correct in pointing out that this Court applies the reasonable 
likelihood prejudice standard in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims. See Appellee's Br. 21; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
689 (1984). Craft has demonstrated that, in applying this standard, his trial 
counsel's deficient performance prejudiced his defense. See Appellant's Br. 31-32, 
35-37. Furthermore, the gravity of trial counsel's deficient performance is 
highlighted by the fact that had trial counsel properly objected to the admission 
of the eyewitness identifications and introduction of the improper hearsay 
statement, the trial court's admission of these would be reviewed under the 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt prejudice standard. See State v. Lujan, 2015 
UT App 199, ,I16; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004); see also 
Appellant's Br. 30-32, 35-37. 
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codefendant hearsay statement was both improper and inflammatory, trial 
counsel's failures to object to the statement and move for a mistrial were 
objectively deficient and not sound trial strategy. See State v. Larrabee, 2013 UT 
70, ,I26, 321 P.3d 1136; State v. King, 2012 UT App 203, ,I14, 283 P.3d 980. 2 
The State argues that Craft cannot establish deficient performance because 
trial counsel's decision to not object to the statement and to not move for a 
mistrial was a strategic determination to not draw unwarranted attention to the 
statement. See Appellee's Br. 40. The State also argues that trial counsel did not 
move for a mistrial because he made a strategic decision that the trial court would 
have likely not granted the motion. Id. at 42. However, the State is mistaken 
because it is not a strategic decision to not object to a hearsay statement when it 
is as inflammatory and improper as the statement at issue in this case. See State 
v. Larrabee, 2013 UT 70, ,28 (stating that "given the improper and 
inflammatory nature of the prosecutor's remarks, it was not reasonable for 
defense counsel to stand silent."). In other words, no reasonable attorney would 
fail to object to the incriminating hearsay statement made by the codefendants 
where the defendant is precluded from his constitutional right to cross-examine 
the statement, and the statement places the defendant at the crime scene, but the 
2 Contrary to the State's argument, a rule 23B remand was not necessary to 
decide Craft's ineffective of assistance of counsel claim as the record is clear that 
Detective Torres introduced the improper co-defendant hearsay statement and 
that defense counsel did not object to the statement. Furthermore, trial counsel's 
failure to object and ask for a mistrial was objectively unreasonable and not 
sound strategy. See Appellee's Br.39; see also Utah R. App. P. 23B; State v. Lee, 
2014 UT App 4, ,r9, 318 P .3d 1164. 
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physical evidence in the case does not. See U.S. Const. amend. VI. See also 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42. 
Furthermore, had defense counsel objected to the inflammatory and 
improper co-defendant hearsay statement and moved for a mistrial, the trial 
judge would have likely granted trial counsel's motion. Even though the 
prosecutor did not draw attention to the statement after it was offered by 
Detective Torres, the single utterance of the statement was extremely damaging 
and not innocuous because it unreliably placed Craft at the crime scene and Craft 
was not able to cross-examine this statement at trial. Cf. State v. Duran, 2011 UT 
App 254, ,I34, 262 P .3d 468 (In the context of a prosecutor giving improper 
remarks at trial, "a mistrial is not required where an improper statement is not 
intentionally elicited, is made in passing, and is relatively innocuous in light of 
all the testimony presented.") (emphasis added) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). 
There is also a reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted 
Craft if the improper codefendant statement had not been introduced at trial. See 
State v. Greuber, 2007 UT 50, ,rg, 165 P .3d 1185. That is, apart from the 
improper, inflammatory, and unreliable hearsay statement, there was no reliable 
evidence that placed Craft at the crime scene. See Appellant's Br. 31, 36. 
Moreover, even if the two instances of deficient performance identified supra are 
not individually prejudicial, they are cumulatively prejudicial. See Appellant's Br. 
37-38. 
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C. Trial Counsel's insufficiency argument was preserved, properly briefed, 
and correct in pointing out that there was insufficient evidence to 
support the convictions in this case. 
Contrary to the State's claim, trial counsel preserved the insufficiency of 
the evidence claim that the evidence did not support Craft's convictions for 
aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary. See Appellee's Br. 45; R. 558. Here, 
trial counsel made a timely directed verdict motion at the close of the State's 
evidence, and the trial judge's response to counsel reflects an understanding that 
counsel objected to the sufficiency of the evidence when he responded with "Mr. 
Davis testified and identified [Craft] as the person being there. That is enough 
[evidence] to take it to the jury, to allow reasonable minds to consider whether or 
not to find him guilty" R. 558 (emphasis added); see also State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 
862, 874 (Utah 1993) (stating that "[a]lthough [trial counsel's] objection was 
vague, the judge clearly understood it when he ruled that the statement was 
admissible ... [and] trial counsel [can] forego explaining his or her grounds for 
objection if the specific ground is apparent from the context, which it obviously 
must have been.") (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
But in the event that this Court decides that counsel did not preserve the 
insufficiency of the evidence claim, this Court can reach this issue under the plain 
error doctrine, an argument sufficiently briefed in Craft's opening brief. See State 
v. Mohamed, 2012 UT App 183, ,I3, 282 P.3d 1066. See also Appellant's Br. 38-
48. That is, in applying State v. Watson, 684 P.2d 39, 41 (Utah 1984), United 
States v. Bonner, 648 F.3d 209, 214-216 (4th Cir.), State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 
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App 126, ,I,I44-47, 47 P.3d 115, and State v. DeJesus, 712 P.2d 246,247 (Utah 
1985), there was insufficient evidence to support Craft's convictions for 
aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary where there was no reliable evidence 
to place Craft at the crime scene. See Appellant's Br. 46-47. Here, Craft was not in 
possession of stolen items and none of his fingerprints nor DNA evidence was 
found at the crime scene. Id. see also R.476,465,548, 551. In addition, the well-
established and abundant case law on this issue should have made the 
insufficiency in this case obvious and fundamental to the trial court. See State v. 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,I17, 10 P .3d 346); see also Appellant's Br. 38-48. Thus, 
contrary to the State's claim, a plain error analysis shows that there was 
insufficient evidence to support Craft's convictions for aggravated robbery and 
aggravated burglary, that the error should have been obvious to the trial court, 
and that Craft was prejudiced by the error because he now has two first degree 
felony convictions where the evidence failed to sufficiently place him at the crime 
scene. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons given above and in the opening brief, Craft respectfully 
asks this Court to reverse and remand 'With an order of dismissal because the 
evidence was insufficient. Alternatively, Craft asks this Court to reverse and 
remand for a new trial because of the improperly admitted evidence regarding 
the unreliable eye-witness identifications and the improper codefendant hearsay 
statement. 
SUBMITTED this 3 0 ~ day of June, 2016. 
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